Now we come to the philosophical approach to the question of the existence of God. I said that there would be two sub-divisions to the philosophical approach, namely, the rational and the moral. Let us take up the rational approach.

The word 'rational' is actually derived from the basic root word 'reason'. When one seriously contemplates the operation of one's own reason, one would recognize that for reason to be dependable, it must have a rational basis. Or, in other words, one's reason must have come from another Reason. During a recent discussion, a senior medical student in Pondicherry put forth several arguments against the existence of god. I told him, "You have depended totally upon your reason to establish that there is no God. How do you know that your reason is dependable? If your reason came by a purely accidental juxtaposition of atoms and molecules and by various bio-chemical processes in the brain, in other words, by purely non-rational means, why should I take your conclusion to be reasonable and dependable?" Of course he had no answer to my question. When you look at scientific enterprise in general, you know that we have reached where we have in our intellectual pursuits only because we have started with the basic assumption that our reason is dependable. In order for your reason to be dependable within our own framework, we need a frame of reference outside of ourselves. For example, the 'intelligence' of a computer, in order to be dependable, has to come from an intelligent computer designer and manufacturer. The evolutionist tells us that, in the final analysis, intelligence came out of non-intelligence and reason came out of non-reason. That is not really acceptable because if reason ultimately comes from non-reason there is no basis to depend upon reason.

Starting with the basic argument of rationality, one has to come to the conclusion that there is a giant REASON Who exists on His own and Who is the source of all other reason in the universe. Such an original Reason can be none other than God.

We are driven to a similar conclusion when we consider the moral approach to the question of the existence of God. Very often atheists explain away morality as purely instinctive behavior. But does this explanation hold water? Let us examine it briefly.

What is an instinct? Animals move by instincts. Whatever they feel like, they do. We human beings have a different dimension. Let me give you an illustration. If I hear a person crying out for help from a distance, I would find two voices operating within me. One voice would suggest that I run away, so that I am also not overtaken by danger. Now that can be called the instinct of self-preservation by which the whole animal kingdom continues to exist and preserve its various species. As a human being, I do not hesitate to admit that I share this instinct with the animals. But I must also admit to hearing another voice within me which says that I must go and help this person in trouble. Now I am not sure whether I would call that an instinct because that is a desire to do the unlikely. One could even explain it away comparing it to a mother's instinct to save the life of her child by sacrificing her own life. But that is not all. I hear a third voice within me which seems to instruct me as to which instinct I should suppress and which one I should strengthen. Now what is this third voice? Can a voice which arbitrates between two instincts be also an instinct itself, or would it belong to another (and higher) category?

As in the case of reason, we find ourselves reflecting the moral values of a Higher Source. We often speak in moral categories whether we believe in God or not. An atheist, for instance, applies the moral argument even to God Himself. He says, "If there is a God, there out not to be this evil". Whenever I use 'ought' language, I am dealing with moral questions which deal with prescriptive laws - how one ought to behave? (When I deal with natural laws like gravity, I am dealing with descriptive laws - things as they are). When I look at this dimension of morality within me, I have no other alternative except to admit that I am referring back to a prescription given by a Prescriber - a moral Lawgiver. Although its standards differ from person to person, moral consciousness does speak of an ultimate moral Lawgiver.

We can think of another everyday occurrence to illustrate the fact that we assume a moral standard outside of our own. We often hear people saying, "A is a (morally) better person than B". On what basis can one make a comparison of this kind? When our son was very young, I used to put him on a high table and tell him, "You are taller than Daddy". He was greatly amused. We adults know better! Real comparison is possible only with reference to a standard outside the two entities being compared. We can say that P is taller than Q, only if both of them stand on the same level ground. We can talk about moral progress only if we are getting closer to an Ideal which is outside of our previous and present states. If there is no such external standard, then we can only say, "A is different from B" and not "A is better than B". By each one of the above considerations, we have to reach the conclusion that there is an ultimate moral Lawgiver with reference to Whose standards our consciences (and even our various religions) derive their own relative standards.